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Abstract 
Although there are a considerable number of research papers dedicated to understanding the WEG 
internationalization process, we believe that the existing case studies are still extremely restricted to the 
counterpoint of the institutional narrative and international theories of internationalization. Our 
perspective, on the other hand, points in the direction of assessing the company’s trajectory within the 
political economy of the sector. That is, it is not possible to analyze the process of transformation of a 
company over decades without understanding the institutional aspects of the whole sector and of the 
national policy that regulates and foments it, as well as the transformations in the international economy, 
in general. In this sense, this paper seeks not only to present WEG's trajectory based on the company’s 
internal strategies and innovations, but also to relate these characteristics to the Brazilian institutional 
environment, especially during the military government, which seems to have been decisive both for the 
rise of the group nationally and for its later entry into the international market. 




WEG Electric Motors, originally named Eletromotores Jaraguá Ltda, is a recognized Brazilian 
Company, which successfully internationalized. 
 
Corresponding author: e-mail: @ub.edu 
Received 29 January 2018 - Accepted 14 May 2018       
 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 
Derivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-comercial re-use and 
distribution, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered or transformed in any way. 
 
Volume 3, Number 2, 57-91, July-December 2018                   doi:10.1344/jesb2018.2.j047  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
58 
Founded in the early 1960s as a small manufacturer of electric motors in Jaraguá do Sul, in the 
state of Santa Catarina, within a few decades the company showed amazing growth. Today, it 
has commercial subsidiaries in 29 countries and 37 industrial parks in 12 countries, selling its 
products to 135 economies, with an annual production of 13.5 million electric motors, according 
to its 2016 report.1 Reinforcing the company’s recognized success, a 2014 Boston Consulting 
Group report highlighted WEG’s role as one of the one hundred most globalized companies in 
the world.   
In view of its trajectory, WEG has recently become a recurrent object of investigation among 
researchers who seek to identify the strategies that have led the company to achieve its place in 
the international market. One quite common research profile in these studies seeks to compare 
WEG’s history with internationalization theories that have already been duly established in the 
academic community. Such studies compare the Brazilian company’s particular experience 
with theories that have been developed to understand the process used by North American and 
European multinational companies to conquer international markets.  
Germana Melo, for example, replicates the Uppsala model, arguing that WEG has undergone 
progressive internationalization, first establishing commercial subsidiaries in order to later 
build production units in the foreign market. However, according to the author, once 
internationalization is achieved, Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm seems more suitable for 
continuous analysis of the process of conquering new markets (Melo 2010, 124). In similar 
perspectives, while Silva et al. (2010, 17) defend WEG's internationalization as having followed 
the “classic strategy” of implementing dynamic and gradual learning processes based on 
experience, Floriani et al. (2009) propose an “integrative framework” of Dunning's economic 
                                                          
1 WEG, Integrated Annual Report, 2016, p. 9. 
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and behavioral theories, considering the advantages of firm ownership and significantly 
emphasizing the organizational competence and dynamic abilities of the company studied. 
Marson and Dalla Costa (2014, 16), on the other hand, construct a narrative of 
internationalization phases that resembles the Uppsala model, even though they do not specify 
the Norwegian model’s phases. Following the company's official history, as displayed on its 
website, they argue that a first phase “occurred in a more casual rather than planned manner. 
Latin American consumers from countries such as Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia 
showed interest in the products and WEG responded to this demand”. For the authors, the 
second phase is characterized by the growth of the representative network in various countries; 
and, finally, the third phase, underway in the last few decades, would be internationalization 
itself, with the establishment of branches and industrial plants abroad (Marson and Dalla Costa 
2014, 17-21).  
Looking at the company’s internal strategies, Jayme Moraes (2004, 123) emphasizes the 
management knowledge accumulated by the company, through the training of human 
resources: “the founders had a decisive influence on the training of human resources, based on 
their boldness, entrepreneurial judgment and ability to identify and attract talent”. In a similar 
perspective, Predebon identifies the success of WEG's internationalization from 1998-2010 as 
being the result of an assertive internal policy of adapting the company's strategies to regional 
integration, generating structural and organizational evolution within the industry. The limits 
of the internal market would have conditioned the expansion to the foreign market, according 
to the author, “with the great cycle of technological and economic changes and, within these 
changes, the new global economic spaces, the organizational geostrategy was unable disregard 
the analysis of regional integration processes within the internationalization processes, since 
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the social, political and economic relations resulting from these global movements will form 
the pathways of future global integration” (Predebon 2010). Also concerning the company’s 
strategies, the author asserts that since the company was founded, its business has been based 
on the creation of a highly qualified technical service network, aimed primarily at building 
customer loyalty, as well as on advertising its products through the accreditation of the first 
technical service professionals in the early 1960s. Through a wide network of distributors and 
commercial representatives, the company started supplying its products to more than 60 
countries in the 1970s, proving its ability to gain significant economies of scale. 
According to Fonseca and Bruno (2009), the adoption of a participatory management model in 
1969 was of decisive importance for WEG to begin exporting electric motors to small markets 
in Latin America. In 1973, the company expanded its products sales to 20 countries, including 
Canada, the United States and countries in Europe; while in 1975, the expansion reached 41 
countries, including Japan. The fact is that the company’s systematic presence in international 
markets started to demand a business plan with a more daring attitude in order to guarantee 
competitive strategies within the electrical equipment sector. In highly competitive 
environments, the development of more aggressive business strategies and a proximity to 
customers become key aspects for “penetrating new markets or maintaining positions in 
international trade” (Coutinho and Ferraz 1994, 237). 
Although the internationalization process for Latin American companies occurred in the 1990s, 
as the result of financial and commercial openness and restructuring of production in their 
economies, it must be noted that the industrial sector has undergone a vigorous process of 
structural change in global terms since the late 1970s. In 1969, WEG, which had just completed 
its eighth anniversary, entered into a massive financing agreement with BNDES (Brazilian 
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Development Bank) to modernize its plants and incorporate German know-how with the 
support of the engineering Ernest Braun. This investment plan allowed the company to triple 
its production in its first phase of internationalization, in order to meet the foreign market’s 
needs. The project also provided for cooperation with other motor manufacturing companies 
and was approved by the Executive Group of the Electric and Electronic Industries (or 
GEINEE, its acronym in Portuguese), which operates under the Industrial Development 
Committee at the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services.2 
Parallel to Brazil's industrial policy goals in the 1960s and 1970s, which prioritized the creation 
of capital-intensive sectors, Amsden (2001) notes that the competitive advantage of business 
groups in late industrialization countries is primarily linked to their planning strategies, 
management, logistics and exports, rather than any other specific ability that such groups may 
have, given that their operational sectors do not generally feature modern technologies. The 
objective here is to understand how, even in the face of this competitive barrier highlighted by 
the author, WEG became the largest manufacturer of electric motors in Latin America and the 
leading Brazilian exporter in this industrial segment. 
Although there is a considerable amount of research devoted to understanding WEG's 
internationalization process, this paper is based on a belief that the existing case studies are still 
extremely circumscribed to the counterpoint of institutional narrative and international theories 
of internationalization. The perspective held by the authors, on the other hand, points in the 
direction of assessing the company’s trajectory within the political economy of the sector. That 
is, it is not possible to analyze the process of a company transformation occurring over decades 
                                                          
2 “Financiamento do BNDE triplica produção para o mercado interno e joga a WEG no mercado externo” O 
Estado de S. Paulo, September 26, 1969, 18. 
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without understanding the institutional aspects of the whole sector and of the national policy 
that regulates and foments it or the transformations in the international economy in general. In 
this sense, this paper seeks not only to present WEG's trajectory based on the company’s 
internal strategies and innovations, but also to relate these characteristics to the Brazilian 
institutional environment: first, during the military government, a decisive period for the rise 
of the group and for its entry into the international market; and secondly, during recent decades, 
when the company received great financial support from the BNDES to pursue its goal of 
internationalization. 
The development of the electrical equipment sector in Brazil, 1950-19603 
The founding of WEG dates back to the early 1960s and was part of a phase of profound 
transformation in the industrial structure of the Brazilian economy. Starting with the Targets 
Plan established by President Juscelino Kubitscheck, the Brazilian economy began to accelerate 
its process of forming a production assets sector, with the participation of the multinationals 
that would be established from that point forward. Over the following two decades, what Peter 
Evans called a "triple alliance" was created, which is the division of the Brazilian market 
between multinational corporations, national enterprises, and the government (Evans 1982). 
National companies, especially in sectors demanding large volumes of capital and modern 
technology, were therefore left with limited or supporting roles in the industrial development 
led by the multinational heavy industry established in the country.  
The electricity sector, in this sense, would be one of those sectors that would undergo great 
transformation in this period. The government was becoming responsible for providing 
                                                          
3 For more on the operations of Eletrobrás in relation to commissioned production within the electrical goods 
sector, see: Sasse (2015). The following discussion was based on Sasse and Saes (2016). 
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services, whether through regional government enterprises in the 1950s or through the federal 
government in the 1960s. Eletrobrás, a company providing commissioned production of 
electrical equipment, was beginning to be established in the country, with consumption that had 
up to that point been supplied through imports now being internalized. The Targets Plan put in 
place during the Kubitschek administration therefore made the energy sector a priority for the 
government, with this sector receiving 43 percent of all investments made between 1957 and 
1961. If the goal was to achieve growth in annual energy output of more than 10 percent a year, 
certainly the demand for equipment represented a bottleneck to be overcome. After all, the 
country's industry only supplied electrical equipment for domestic use, electrical installations, 
wires and conductors, while it depended on imports for generators, turbines and transformers 
(Lessa 1975, 18-9). 
Illustrating the government’s new tone in 1956, one of the main characters in the development 
of the Targets Plan, Lucas Lopes, pointed out the need to “integrate forces” in order to respond 
to the demand for electrical materials. Lopes also indicated the option of incorporating 
international private capital into the production of capital goods in the Brazilian economy.4 In 
order to overcome the limits of payment balance and allow the industrialization process to 
continue, the development strategy employed by the Kubitschek administration was to 
encourage multinationals to enter the Brazilian market. In this sense, while the State fostered 
economic growth through investments in infrastructure, international private initiative 
introduced industries through multinational companies that were more technologically 
sophisticated - reducing the pressure to import products central to industrial development - and 
                                                          
4 “O estado de Minas e o Plano de eletrificação do governo federal. Declarações do Sr. Lucas Lopes sobre a 
participação do capital estrangeiro neste empreendimento”. O Estado S. Paulo, November 21, 1956. General, 5. 
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national private groups developed on the fringes of these new industries in order to provide 
basic equipment and material to those multinational companies (Evans 1982; Lago et al. 1979, 
100).  
The government’s presence was fundamental to articulate investments in infrastructure, 
opening up favorable horizons for negotiations and for attracting direct investment in the 
durable consumer goods and production goods industries, within the international scenario of 
multinational companies’ expanding to late industrialized countries (Lima 1995, 76). Among 
the government’s tools for encouraging foreign industries to come to the country, the most 
relevant was Currency and Credit Board Instruction no. 113, which fostered the opening of the 
market and, consequently, increased the participation of the capital goods industry in national 
economic production as a whole, in addition to causing changes in the sector's configuration. 
According to Venilton Tadini’s survey on the structure of the Brazilian industrial sector, the 
capital goods sector, which accounted for five percent of the manufacturing industry’s gross 
production value in 1949, accounted for approximately 10 percent in 1959. In addition, 
regarding company capital sources, 75 percent of these companies relied mainly on national 
capital at the beginning of the period, while in 1961 this share fell to 61 percent (Tadini 1986, 
24-26; Lago et al. 1979, 113). This trend would be even more pronounced in modern sectors, 
since these national companies mostly worked with the production of less technologically 
complex equipment.5 On-demand capital goods from the power sector, such as turbines and 
generators, could take years to be produced if they had to be adapted to the specific aspects of 
                                                          
5 Leff states that half of the firms that allowed the capital goods industry to diversify in Brazil, with "the most 
complex product lines," were subsidiaries of foreign companies (Leff 1968, 24). 
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each project. This process required a financial and technological structure that was not available 
to private national groups.6 
With space open for companies from abroad to now operate in the Brazilian market, there was 
a notable trend during the period of foreign companies setting up power sector plants. 
According to data from the Brazilian Infrastructure and Heavy Industry Association (ABDIB – 
Associação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento da Indústria de Base), the companies formed in 
Brazil in the period, or the ones that had set up plants to produce capital goods, were: Sade – 
Sul Americana de Engenharia. S.A. (Italy), in 1953; Ibrave – I. B. Válvulas e Equipamentos 
Ltda. (USA), in 1954; CBC Indústrias Pesadas S.A. (Japan), in 1955; Mecânica Pesada S.A., 
from the Schneider group (France), in 1955; IND.EL. Brown Boveri S.A. (Switzerland), in 
1957; Coemsa Eletromecânica S.A. (Italy), in 1960; General Electric (USA), in 1962; and 
Siemens (Germany), in 1963. (Tadini 1986, 131-3).7 
Regarding this data, until the mid-1950s Brazil essentially relied on imported equipment to 
meet the increased demand for power generation. However, with multinationals arriving in the 
country in the early 1960s, it is possible to affirm that there was already developed production 
in the country, which was available to the new hydroelectric projects under construction (Table 
1). The 29th goal of the Targets Plan was then fulfilled: domestic production of equipment such 
as hydraulic turbines, generators, transformers and motors above 20HP. This equipment was 
mainly produced as a result of multinational participation in the national economy. 
 
                                                          
6 Cf. Lessa (1975); Leff (1968); Lago et al. (1979) and Erber (1974). 
7 General Electric and Siemens had already been producing goods in Brazil since the 1920s, but their plants were 
designed for the production of small-scale products or consumer goods, such as small appliances. With the General 
Electric factories in Campinas and the Siemens factories in São Paulo, these companies began to offer more 
complex products, such as hydro generators and higher power transformers (Cachapuz 2006, 252). 
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Table 1. Imports as a percentage of domestic consumption (1949-1961)8 
Sector 1949 1958 1961 
Metallurgical 22 12 12 
Electrical Material 45 13 17 
Transport Equipment 57 31 19 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 29 20 17 
Paper 10 4 4 
Rubber Products 10 5 7 
Textiles 6 1 1 
Mechanical Products 64 42 46 
Source: Leff 1968, 145. 
Thus, there was an increase in the relative share of domestic production in the domestic market; 
based on this, from 1958 to 1961, imports in US dollars were 11.7 percent higher, while real 
domestic output rose by 93.4 percent (Lago et al. 1979, 110). In other words, the Targets Plan 
allowed the heavy electrical materials industry to flourish in the 1960s through foreign 
exchange instruments and by making the government an important consumer (Leff 1968, 22, 
104).9 It is worth noting that nationalization of production by establishing capital goods 
industries in the country did not mean nationalization of the control of these companies. 
Development of the sector, with government support, was based on stimulus for multinational 
                                                          
8 Leff’s data regard the general consumption of goods in each sector. In relation to the power sector, when solely 
considering data on the consumption of capital goods in this sector, average imports in the early 1960s is between 
30 percent and 40 percent (Lago et al. 1979, 133).  
9 According to Fabio Erber: “between the postwar period and the 1960s, the public sector's share in gross capital 
formation in the country rose from 22 percent to 55 percent, which provides an idea of the State’s demand for 
equipment” (Erber 1974, 18).  
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companies to enter the Brazilian market, such as Voith, Brown Boveri, Siemens and General 
Electric (Table 2). 
Table 2. Main suppliers of turbines and hydro generators (1969-1986) 
Share of national companies supplying 
turbines in the Brazilian market (%) 
Share of national companies supplying 
hydro generators in the Brazilian market 
(%) 
Voith 60.0 Brown Boveri 44.7 
Mecânica Pesada 31.3 Siemens 33.6 
Coemsa-Ansaldo 3.8 Coemsa 3.9 
Villares 3.6 General Electric/Villares 17.8 
Bardella 1.3    
Total 100.0 Total  100.0 
Source: Strachman 1992, 251 and 266. 
This was the context in which the metalworking industry in Santa Catarina, especially in 
northeastern Santa Catarina, reached the southeastern market in Brazil.10 Driven by government 
policies, these industries were consolidated in the 1950s, supplying the automotive and public 
services sectors, such as sanitation and the electrical grid formation. Industrialists in the 
Joinville region, who maintained close ties with Europe and especially with Germany (for 
technological research, specialized labor and professional qualification), used their own 
                                                          
10 In Jaraguá do Sul, local development was linked to that of other nearby cities, such as Joinville and Blumenau. 
In its home city, WEG, in a sense, shared the market with Kohlbach, which emerged in 1945 from an electrical 
appliances repair shop run by Rodolfo Kohlbach that had been operating since at least the late 1930s. This company 
began to manufacture dynamos and alternators in the 1950s; later, in the 1960s, it began small-scale production of 
electric motors. Kohlbach was acquired by Nova Motores e Geradores Elétricos Ltda. in 1996 (A Notícia, August 
3, 1938). These electrical equipment sector companies, along with Malwee, Wiest, Marisol and other important 
companies in the city, had substantial needs in terms of manpower. In order to supply this demand, workers in 
Jaraguá do Sul were to a large extent brought in from the state of Paraná (where WEG was especially well-known), 
attracted by the strategies of local firms, such as advertising (Schörner 2006; Moretti 1988). 
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resources to make investments, but also took advantage of financing, such the FINAME and 
BNDES/BADESC lines. Therefore, WEG, along with companies such as Hansen, Embraco and 
Nielson, expanded their activities from the 1950s to the 1980s by setting up units abroad. 
This led to completion of a new development model for the national power sector in the 1960s, 
which would last over the next two decades. The government, through federal and state 
government-run companies, was responsible for investing in infrastructure through 
construction of hydroelectric power plants. The result was that from 1962 to 1980, the 
electricity generation increased from 5.729 MW to 31.147 MW. There had been a time when 
private international capital contributed to building the sector, both in the provision of services 
and in exporting equipment to Brazil. However, at that time, this capital was used to internalize 
production, ensuring these companies maintained their market shares and taking advantage of 
government support, whether to establish companies in the country or to be the consumer of 
products. National capital remained at the edges of the market, through industries that would 
provide inputs to the newly-installed multinationals or that served to produce less 
technologically complex goods. 
The founding and growth of WEG during the military government 
Scholars have pointed out that the military government managed to intensify the process of 
import-substituting industrialization that had been increased since the early 1950s. This 
movement led to unprecedented industrial growth that was stimulated by a set of economic 
policies, such as quantitative import restrictions, tariffs, direct exchange control, fiscal 
subsidies, and easier access to credit. A substantial structural change was also evident and the 
vertical integration of the intersectoral relationships in industry was another striking feature of 
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the Brazilian economy during the military period, between 1964 and 1985 (Macario 1964; Baer, 
Fonseca and Guilhoto 1987). 
Modern industries, like electrical goods manufacturing, were greatly benefited by duties and 
charges applied being to imports that would be considered high by international standards. 
According to Serra (1984, 81), the Brazilian government gave industrial development a big 
push in two different ways: (i) by arranging and financially supporting investments that would 
determine the main structural changes in the economy; and (ii) by creating infrastructure and 
direct production of intermediate goods that were crucial for the heavy industrialization process. 
These features express Hirschman’s (1968) late-latecomers tenet: countries that have a 
technological gap in relation to more advanced economies. 
In this regard, WEG has modified its technology management standard since 1968. While 
improvements prevailed based on practical knowledge of the workforce and the founding 
members, German technology was acquired in the late 1960s in a way that boosted production 
from 1968 to 1974. Investments in machinery, equipment and new materials grew 415 percent 
from 1967 to 1969, considering the company’s resources and the financial support of the 
BNDES. The main changes that occurred at the company during this period are therefore 
technical in nature, such as the hiring of engineers and consultants, creation of a training center 
and laboratories (which would later spawn CentroWEG), and structuring of technical 
commissions to resolve production problems. 
The period of 1968 to 1973 characterized a phase in which the government ended up 
establishing loan agreements based on supplier credit as the result of its need to find new 
sources of funds to finance the construction of hydroelectric power plants. That is, foreign loans 
targeting major hydroelectric power plant projects were contingent upon the purchase of 
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imported equipment specified by creditors. Yet, this policy would have little effect on WEG, 
as it entered the electrical equipment market with no resistance from the biggest players, whose 
focus was on producing turbines and generators. Put another way, WEG focused on a portfolio 
of less sophisticated products, such as engines and transformers. Even when it started to produce 
turbines, the company emphasized the Small Hydro market instead of businesses that were 
already dominated by established multinationals in the country.  
A second moment of this phase began in 1971. Once again, government resources were 
fundamental for investments to expand production: together, support from FUNDEC, BRDE, 
and BNDES financed 50 percent of the company’s investment (Coutinho 1995). Moreover, the 
company went public this same year and its shares began to be traded on stock exchanges. In 
1973, construction started on the second plant, which was completed four years later. During 
this time, WEG began to strengthen its business and it soon cast engine housings, produced 
copper wires and developed its own precision tooling; even its wooden packaging received 
investments (Vidigal 2011; Fonseca and Bruno 2009). 
In the second half of the 1970s, the company's management underwent professionalization that 
resulted in technology being developed to produce medium-sized engines and in consolidation 
of the Technological Center. This was therefore a period of gains of scale and technological 
improvements that led to production being restructured through the creation of specialized 
operational units (specialization with intrasectoral diversification) and to initial movement 
towards intersectoral productive diversification (Coutinho 1995). At that time, the company 
had already reached markets in 20 countries, mainly in Latin America. In addition, in 1976, it 
opened an office in Germany whose good results were due to the company’s relationship with 
local producers. 
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In Germany, the company started to hire technical advisors to develop technology, installing a 
subsidiary in the country years later. However, it did not establish a direct association with 
foreign capital, which gave the company greater autonomy. The subsidiary allowed WEG to 
approach the international market, providing consulting services and maintenance services for 
exported products. Once established in the international market, WEG went through a profound 
transformation from 1975 to 1985, the period when it reached maturity. This can be seen in 
substantial growth in the number of workers, as a result of the expansion of industrial plants 
and the diversification of its products (Graph 1). 
Graph 1. Number of workers employed by WEG (1965-2000) 
 
Source: Ternes (1997); Goularti Filho (2016); Coutinho (1995) 
Movement towards diversification of the production structure, first as a result of the Targets 
Plan and later due to the Second National Development Plan (II PND), supports some of the 
arguments made by Dani Rodrik (2007) about the “externalities” that decisively interfere in the 
implementation of new productive sectors in the economy. Such externalities, which the author 
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diversification is unlikely to be carried out without the direct intervention of the government or 
without any other governmental action to encourage private industrial investment. 
In the case of information externalities, entrepreneurs should make small adjustments according 
to the technologies adopted by foreign producers and adapt them to local conditions. This 
process is called “self-discovery”, according to Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). It can be applied 
to the fact that, in 1979, WEG announced the formation of a joint-venture with ASEA, a 
Swedish company, in order to develop of engineering, manufacturing, sales, assembly, and 
technical assistance projects for electrical products and systems. The association with the 
Swedish company gave rise to the WEG/ASEA Industrial Ltda. Company. On the one hand, 
the activities of the Eletromotores WEG Company, which worked exclusively with national 
capital, continued to focus on the production of AC and DC motors as well as alternators. 
ASEA, on the other hand, focused on the production of transformers and relays, in addition to 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution services.11  
Another challenge inherent to the process of diversification is associated with coordination 
externalities. Failures in the coordination of investments are common when new industries find 
advantages in importing their main inputs, thus making the coordination of simultaneous 
investments unnecessary. In general, it is difficult to predict whether an entrepreneur’s 
individual investment decision will be accompanied by other complementary initiatives. The 
government must therefore foster the viability of certain production chains by working with the 
private sector to coordinate the investments required to ensure an individual return on each 
project. Otherwise, these projects would fail to generate returns if they were implemented in an 
isolated manner (Almeida 2013, 278). 
                                                          
11 “WEG e ASEA comunicam”. O Estado de S. Paulo, November 20, 1979, 28. 
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Unsurprisingly, the industrial policy implemented during the period of the “economic miracle” 
was characterized by significant subsidies for exporting manufactured goods. Among the 
results of this policy is an exceptionally high growth rate (20.5 percent per year) on domestic 
production of capital goods from 1967 to 1973, which rose from 9.0 million to 27.7 million 
cruzeiros (Bonelli and Malan 1976, 386-387). Granting of government subsidies, in addition to 
other incentives such as tax exemptions for certain companies and sectors, can be interpreted 
as government efforts to facilitate the identification of goods whose production the country 
could efficiently internalize. Given that such incentives were usually aimed at new production 
activities, the industrial policy of the military governments of the late 1960s and 1970s assumed 
the role of determining the pace of the import substitution process. 
In order to illustrate the topics addressed above, in 1981 WEG received funding from the 
Industrial Development Council (CDI – Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial), which 
approved almost one hundred industrial projects in that fiscal year. The company was then able 
to develop its projects geared towards the Eletromotores WEG S.A plants, which took over the 
activities of WEG Acionamentos S.A. and WEG Máquinas S.A (created in 1980 and located in 
Jaraguá do Sul, Santa Catarina), making up the electronic core of the group.12 The company, 
which became the biggest producer of electric motors in Latin America in the 1980s, started to 
maintain commercial representatives in the largest cities in southern and southeastern Brazil, in 
addition to creating three manufacturing units exporting to over three dozen countries. During 
that same decade, its production and employment figures grew at an extortionate rate, based on 
the creation of WEG Transformadores (1981), WEG Energia (1981) and WEG Química (1983), 
in addition to its own research center (1980), allowing for production of the first high power 
                                                          
12 “CDI aprova 97 projetos este ano”. O Estado de S. Paulo, December 29, 1981, 30. 
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engines (100-200kw). WEG’s movement towards diversifying production included the 
manufacturing of transformers, large electric machines, and paints and varnishes. This 
expansion of the company's production schedule was facilitated by the acquisitions of Ecemic 
Transformadores de Blumenau, which became WEG Transformadores, Quimicaflora de 
Joinville and Tintas Michigan de Guaramirim (Santa Catarina), which became WEG Química 
(Ternes 1997; Vidigal 2011).13 
This growth in the company and diversification in production were the result of the government 
policy implemented in the mid-1970s under the auspices of the Second National Development 
Plan, which sought to strengthen national companies’ production capacity for intermediate and 
capital goods, aimed at promoting the import substitution process. This policy intended to 
relieve the short-term pressures on balance of payment accounts, especially after the first 
international oil crisis. Among the Plan’s proposals was transformation of small- and medium-
sized companies in these two sectors into large companies, which would then serve to supply 
government-owned companies with machinery and raw materials. 
In fact, the spread of government-owned enterprises was seen as the key to raising the rate of 
capital accumulation in Brazil during the second half of the 1970s. Considering all levels of 
government (federal, state, and municipal), nonfinancial public-sector expenditures as a ratio 
of GDP increased from 42.7 percent in 1975 to 52.7 percent in 1980, and investments by 
government-owned enterprises as a ratio of GDP rose from 18.6 percent from 1974 to 1978 to 
25.6 percent from 1979 to 1981 (Bulmer-Thomas 2014, 378). The Geisel administration (1974-
                                                          
13 In addition to these activities, WEG Florestal Ltda was created in 1980, which is a supplier of wooden packaging 
to the group's companies. In 1984, the group acquired shareholding control of Indústria de Pescados Penha (in 
Santa Catarina), and WEG Penha Pescados was created. The creation of these companies was brought about by 
the absorption of tax exemptions. Other acquisitions outside of the core business were made in the agribusiness 
sector, such as a stake in Perdigão and Teka Agroindustrial between 1987 and 1989, as well as in the insurance 
services sector, with WEG Seguros, founded in 1987. 
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79) was marked by not only high investment rates and output growth, but also by government 
expenditures and policies designed to accelerate industrial development, improve private sector 
profitability, and encourage new private sector initiatives. These were the main goals of the 
Second National Development Plan (Fonseca and Monteiro 2007). 
According to Strachman (1992), the rate of “nationalization” of turbines and hydrogenerators 
– that is, production within the country, including through multinationals – reached an 
approximate average of 60 percent from 1969 to 1985. Tadini (1986, 83) even claims that in 
1985 this rate reached 90 percent. In the on-demand capital goods sector, an area in which WEG 
excels, the substitution process was already evident between 1973 and 1981, as shown by Albert 
Fishlow (1986, 521). The import coefficient of this segment in particular fell noticeably: from 
0.66 in 1973, it reached 0.37 in 1979 until leveling out at 0.40 in 1981. 
Although sectorial indices were indicating a drop in the share of imports in total supplies, it was 
only after 1977 that the aggregate import coefficient fell below its 1973 level (Fishlow 1986, 
520). At any rate, judging by the main goal of the Geisel administration, which was to expand 
and diversify the production capacity of the industrial inputs sector, the government stimulated 
demand through ambitious infrastructure projects that it was unable to finance. The alternative 
of pursuing accelerated growth through external debt was only a short-term solution for the 
issue of adjusting the balance of payments. At the same time, internal imbalances soon proved 
to be the evident limitations of the monetary correction instruments that had been implemented 
since the early years of the military regime. 
The conquest of the international market 
From the beginning of the exportation of electric motors in 1970 up until the mid-1980s, WEG 
benefited from the protectionism practiced by Brazilian economic policy, which allowed the 
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company to take the lead in the domestic market, with improvements in scale and scope, which 
are key aspects in becoming internationally competitive. It is also important to mention that 
WEG's main competitors in the domestic market were Búfalo, Motores Elétricos do Brasil, and 
GE — three companies that withdrew from the market in the late 1980s — as well as the Eberle 
and Arno companies. In addition to producing engines, WEG Máquinas and WEG 
Acionamentos expanded considerably in the 1980s as the result of a typical policy of incentives 
to create new areas for the Brazilian domestic economy. These so-called “novelty” areas, 
according to Rodrik (2007), refer both to products considered to be new in the national economy 
as well as to new production technologies for products that were already being manufactured 
in the country.  
In contrast to the poor performance of the Brazilian economy, companies producing electrical 
equipment in the 1980s and 1990s in northeast Santa Catarina saw growth in sales. In the field 
of electric motors in particular, WEG Motores and Kolhbach gained space, to the detriment of 
their domestic competitors: Arno (SP), Búfalo (SP), Motores Elétrico Brasil (SP) and General 
Electric (SP). Smaller companies, such as Mega Transformers (oil transformers) and Waltec 
(low voltage transformers), both from Blumenau, also performed well in the period. Silva 
(1997) highlights the positive effects of the Geisel administration’s economic policy and the 
investment program in basic inputs and capital goods, the already mentioned Second National 
Development Plan. In addition, it highlights the role of production financing vehicles during 
this same period, such as FUNDESC14, PROCAPE15 (which would replace FUNDESC after 
                                                          
14 Fundo de Desenvolvimento do Estado de Santa Catarina, which used budgetary resources to acquire shares and 
debentures of companies in Santa Catarina, later, by Law SC 4.225/68, was modified to operate under a tax 
incentive scheme. 
15 Programa Especial de Apoio a Capitalização de Empresas, Law SC 5.159/75, state authority that participated in 
the shareholding of companies with investments in Santa Catarina, and worked until 1983. 
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1975), PRODEC16 and the BRDE (Regional Bank for the Development of the Extreme South) 
and BADESC17 (Development Bank of the State of Santa Catarina). In this context, “WEG 
managed to make heavily subsidized investments” (Silva 1997, 484).  
Even so, after a phase of production growth during the Second National Development Plan, the 
company had relatively stagnant production in the first half of the 1980s. In the opinion of 
Abinee, there was significant domestic demand in the months following the launch of the 
Cruzado Plan that would allow for recovery in the sector, especially with regard to electronic 
components manufacturers. Regarding the electrical equipment industry, there was an 
expectation that recovery would be limited, since its sales were credited to the period preceding 
introduction of the monetary package. According to the newspaper: “In terms of sales, the 
businessmen in this segment [electrical equipment] - which is already chronically dependent on 
supplying government-owned companies - saw their prospects limited even further with the 
issue of the economic reform.”18 
In 1985, WEG SA became a holding company and created WEG Motores to take over the 
operational functions of the group’s main activity, which at that time was responsible more than 
70 percent of its revenues. From that point forward, the second half of the 1980s would see a 
sharp increase in the company’s production, and only WEG Motores would more than double 
its revenues in the period. Completing the diversification process within the electronics 
division, WEG Automação Ltda was created in 1986, based on the experiences of WEG 
Acionamentos, which aimed to broaden the group’s core business (Table 3). This strategy of 
                                                          
16 Programa de Desenvolvimento da Empresa Catarinense, Law SC 7.320/88, created to operate with the granting 
of credit. 
17 Created in 1973. Together with BRDE, it was financial agent of federal funds, such as FUNCENE, FIPEME 
and FINAME. 
18 “Freio no consumo”. O Estado de S.Paulo, July 25, 1986, 96.    
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seeking to engage in activities with great potential to create new areas of specialization made 
the company the undisputed leader in the electrical equipment sector, a situation that also had 
positive outcomes from the financial point of view, according to research based on the financial 
statements of the companies in this branch of the industry.19  
Table 3. Revenue at WEG Group companies (in millions of US$) - 1985, 1989 to 1992) 
Production Units 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 
WEG Motores 87.8 186.6 198.26 146.21 135.38 
WEG Máquinas 7.6 26.9 35.03 18.54 20.19 
WEG Acionamentos 7.3 20.1 24.37 18.71 12.72 
WEG Transformadores 7.2 17.5 19.22 13.93 13.54 
WEG Automação - 0.3 0.86 1.88 2.52 
WEG Química 4.6 14.4 15.16 14.11 16.29 
WEG Pescados 6.0 13.3 na na na 
WEG Florestal 0.1 2.2 na na na 
Total 121.2 281.4 na na 215 
Caption: na – not available  
Source: Coutinho (1995); Ternes (1997) 
Nevertheless, the concession of the Petrobras Qualidade-86 Award to WEG showed the 
importance of the public sector as a customer for the electric motor company. In his acceptance 
speech, Ozires Silva, President of Petrobras, highlighted the quality of WEG’s products, whose 
electric motors with a capacity of up to 5000 HP were used in the company’s pipelines, trucks 
and, especially, at oil production platforms.20 WEG Motores was also awarded the Cacex 
                                                          
19 “Indústria repete desempenho satisfatório”. O Estado de S. Paulo, July 25, 1986, 97. 
20 “Petrobrás dá prêmio à Odebrecht e à WEG”. O Estado de S. Paulo, October 16, 1986, 35. 
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Market Achievement Award (Troféu Conquista de Mercado) for its export performance in 
1988, which reached US$ 27 million, and the high share that the company’s foreign market 
sales represented (Graph 2). The company exported to 54 countries at the time, making it the 
fifth largest company in the world and the largest in Latin America.21 
Graph 2. Share of foreign market sales (1970 to 1997) 
 
Source: WEG (2000) 
Given the facts and specificities pointed out so far, it is clear that WEG was one of the 
companies whose good economic and financial performance was largely due to the 
government’s role as an entrepreneur during the 1970s and 1980s. This role is not exercised 
exclusively, but it is exercised fundamentally by government-run enterprises, which are at the 
same time political and economic agents. According to Philippe Faucher (1982, 96): “This 
presupposes that a whole process of mediation is carried out between competing interests, as 
well as a conciliation effort to determine the modalities of distribution of costs and advantages 
in the short and long term”. In other words, once State intervention in the Brazilian economy 
reached its peak during the 1970s (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014), the government’s intention 
                                                          
21 “SC amplia exportações”. O Estado de S. Paulo, July 11, 1989, 18. 
 
Volume 3, Number 2, 57-91, July-December 2018                   doi:10.1344/jesb2018.2.j047  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
80 
to not only aid economic growth but, above all, to maximize it became clear. In order to 
guarantee continued upward growth in the Brazilian economy, which was being limited by 
structural and economic factors, particularly after 1973, the government was forced to 
increasingly occupy private sector spaces of economic activity. 
The period that began with the Collor administration (1989-1992) and continued with the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1994-2002) was characterized by a policy of 
opening up to the international market. Even with a more competitive scenario, the company 
took advantage of tax and credit benefits in order to more aggressively internationalize. 
Therefore, as the company could depend less on government purchases than the previous 
decades, it could access funds from the BNDES to buy machinery, equipment and input 
materials exempt from import taxes (up to one-third of the firm’s exports) and use the 
investments to increase its international market share. All of the companies in the group were 
negatively impacted by a recession in the early 1990s. WEG Pescados was sold in an effort to 
focus on the core business of electric machines. Another change came in 1993, when WEG 
Automação (which at the time of its formation was located in Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, in 
order to enter partnerships with the Federal University of Santa Catarina) was moved to Jaraguá 
do Sul, near Manufacturing Plant II, also incorporating the electronics line of WEG 
Acionamentos (Coutinho 1995).  
Along with the resumed Brazilian economic growth in the second quarter of the 1990s, the 
company significantly grew its exports, adopting an aggressive commercial strategy that point 
forward, with the opening of subsidiaries in Argentina, the United States, Europe, Australia and 
Japan. To achieve this objective, WEG was targeted by PRODEC (Program for the 
Development of the Business Sector of Santa Catarina) from 1998 to 1999, receiving huge 
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incentives of around R$173 million, or about 12.2 percent of the program’s total resources. 
Although WEG's internationalization is considered an intentional element that came from top 
management at the company (from founders Eggon João da Silva, Werner Voigt and Geraldo 
Werninghaus as well as from the company’s directors), the company could not have fulfilled 
this goal without government support. However, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when the 
government and domestic market demanded large quantities of equipment, it was the 
international market that had the best opportunities in the 1990s (Table 4).       
Table 4. WEG exports in US$ millions, 1978-2017 
Year  WEG Exports in millions of US$ Year WEG Exports in millions of US$ 
1978 5.1 2002 119.8 
1979 7.5 2003 173.2 
1986 7.6 2004 243.8 
1989 22.9 2005 306.0 
1990 29.0 2006 434.0 
1991 30.0 2007 552.3 
1992 37.0 2008 658.3 
1993 42.0 2009 518.9 
1994 63.0 2010 524.9 
1995 78.0 2011 760.8 
1996 89.0 2012 625.2 
1997 107.0 2013 740.6 
1998 113.1 2014 762.3 
1999 97.7 2015 581.8 
2000 84.0 2016 585.7 
2001* 135.7 2017*  545.4 
*Values estimated by multiple linear regression, using 19 observations of the exports of Jaraguá do Sul-SC and 
the average exchange rate of the year. Relevant statistics: Multiple R: 0,9822; R² adjusted: 0,9603; F of 
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significance: 2,39677E-12; Coefficients: Intersection: -94,4636 (Valor-P: 0,0516); Exports of Jaraguá: 1,2528 
(Valor-P: 5,31817E-13); Exchange rate (US$/R$): 40,5147 (Valor-P: 0,0333); 95 percent confidence interval. 
Standard error: US$ 49.94 million.  
Source: Vegini, Leite, Fiates (2011); Valente Júnior (2016); Rocha (2004); Revista Exame (2016). 
After its first acquisitions of industrial plants abroad in Argentina and Mexico (2000), and later 
in Portugal (2002), WEG picked up a more intense pace of acquisitions. Between 2004 and 
2006, control was acquired over three additional foreign factories: two in Mexico and one in 
China. As of 2009, a global insertion strategy had already been outlined, in which WEG is an 
important Brazilian player in the international market. During this phase, the company opened 
its the fourth factory in Mexico (2009). It built its first plant in India (2010). It made new 
acquisitions in Argentina (Pulverlux paint factory), Austria (Watt Drive, gearboxes and geared 
motors) and the United States (Electric Machinery, high voltage rotating machinery) in 2011. 
It acquired Zest Group of South Africa in 2012 and expanded activities in South Africa with 
the acquisition of Hawker Siddeley Electric Africa Pty in 2013. It also acquired 
Württembergische Elektromotoren (electric motors and geared motors), Antriebstechnik KATT 
Hessen (electric motors manufacturer) in Germany, as well as the Sinya Group and the CMM 
Group in Changzhou, China, and the FTC Energy Group (automation) in Colombia in 2014; 
more acquisitions were made with Transformadores Suntec, of Colombia, and Autrial S.L. 
(electrical panels for industrial plants), of Spain, in 2015. Finally, in 2016, the company bought 
Bluffton Motor Works, LLC. (electric motors) in the United States and CG Power USA Inc, 
specialized in distribution transformers. Major industrial investments were made in Asia, 
Africa, North America and Europe (Figure 1). 22  
In Brazil, during this same period, the company’s industrial asset also added important 
manufacturing units, reaching 14 manufacturing units in 2017. Since 2010, WEG has continued 
                                                          
22 WEG, 2012a; WEG, 2013a; WEG, 2014a; WEG, 2015a; WEG, 2016a; WEG, 2017a. 
 
Volume 3, Number 2, 57-91, July-December 2018                   doi:10.1344/jesb2018.2.j047  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
83 
its internationalization efforts, promoting a series of acquisitions that have made its industrial 
park more robust outside of Brazil. 
Figure 1. WEG subsidiaries and manufacturing units (1995-2005-2017)  
 
Source: Prepared by the authors from WEG (2018); WEG (2017a); Silva (2010); WEG (2000); Vidigal (2011). 
In Brazil, during this same period, the company’s industrial asset also added important 
manufacturing units, reaching 14 manufacturing units in 2017. Since 2010, WEG has continued 
its internationalization efforts, promoting a series of acquisitions that have made its industrial 
park more robust outside of Brazil. Acquisitions abroad were therefore combined with 
acquisitions in Brazil, as in the case of Mesba Motores Elétricos de Guarulhos (a major producer 
of electric motors for household appliances), acquired in 1997, and more recently HISA 
(Hidráulica Industrial Ltda., of Joaçaba, Santa Catarina, which has produced turbines and other 
hydromechanical equipment for small hydro power stations since the 1950s) (Vidigal 2011; 
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HISA 2017).23 This movement was apparent from the growth in the WEG Group's Net 
Operating Revenue. As of 2012, revenues coming from outside of Brazil have outperformed 
the domestic market (Table 5).  
Table 5. Net Operating Revenue (millions of US$ - average sales for the period) 
Year Domestic 
market 
% Foreign market % Total 
2010 1.501 63 870 37 2.371 
2011 1.733 56 1.365 44 3.098 
2012 1.543 49 1.615 51 3.159 
2013 1.591 50 1.574 50 3.165 
2014 1.647 49 1.684 51 3.332 
2015 1.269 43 1.661 57 2.930 
2016 1.147 43 1.537 57 2.684 
2017 1.317 44 1.667 56 2.984 
Source: WEG. Annual Reports. 2011-2016; WEG. Financial Statements. 2011-2017. 
Again, these results in the international market would not have been reached without 
government support. WEG’s place as a government darling was reaffirmed during the Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010). Using the BNDES as an instrument to boost 
national companies, the policy undertaken by the Brazilian government was to finance national 
companies so that they could achieve the best position possible in the global market. This was 
done, for instance, through the internationalization line, through which the BNDES supported 
                                                          
23 Acquisitions: Hisa (turbines for Small Hydro), in 2007; Trafo (transformers) and Instrutech (electronic sensors) 
in 2010; Equisul (critical power) in 2011; Stardur Tintas, WEG-Cestari (geared motors) and Injetel (sockets and 
switches), in 2012; Paumar (paints) in 2013; Efacec Energy Service (maintenance of electrical equipment), 
Pernanbubo, in 2014; and TGM (turbines and transmissions) in 2016 (WEG, 2012a; WEG, 2013a; WEG, 2014a; 
WEG, 2015a; WEG, 2016a; WEG, 2017a). 
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construction of the WEG plant in India (BNDES 2017, 293). From 2003 to 2016, the company 
received investments of R$ 1.486 million from this development bank. 
Graph 4. Direct and indirect non-automatic investments (amount contracted in millions, BRL) 
 
Source: BNDES, portal da transparência: CNPJ: 07.175.725/0001-60 - WEG equipamentos eletricos S/A. 
Additionally, WEG has been a traditional customer of export financing lines, essentially the 
pre-shipment financing lines, where BNDES finances part of the company’s production 
destined for export, helping in competitive cost formation so that the company can operate in 
the international market, offering more favorable prices and conditions to clients, compatible 
with international competitors. BNDES has therefore helped the company to conquer new 
markets and consolidate its position as one of the largest Brazilian exporters of capital goods 
and one of the largest players in the world in its industry. The development of new WEG 
products and processes is also supported by BNDES through its funds, which contributed to the 
frequency and consistency of the group's investment in innovation (BNDES 2017, 319-321).  
In short, there were three international insertion strategies, as usually recalled in the literature 
aimed at understanding company’s internationalization: distribution and commercial 
representation by third parties; creation of dedicated companies for distribution and after-sales 
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combined and used in parallel. Unlike traditional historiography, the availability of public 
resources was what permitted such a quantitative and qualitative leap forward by WEG, giving 
less prominence to the figure of the “innovative entrepreneur”. 
Final considerations 
At the beginning of 2010, WEG celebrated its fifty-year anniversary. It started as a small 
electric equipment production company and moved forward to conquer the international 
economy, becoming a market leader. The history of WEG is filled with elements ripe for an 
analysis based on the company’s strategy and the internal decisions that would allow for 
possible internationalization. Its founders have been concerned with the issue of knowledge 
management, not only by training their employees, but also by establishing international 
partnerships to keep abreast of technological innovations. The company, in addition, followed 
with the usual route to internationalization noted in the literature, initially exporting to 
neighboring markets and expanding its operations with offices and commercial branches 
abroad, until, in recent decades, conquering the market by building and acquiring plants in a 
variety of countries.  
Notwithstanding these effective achievements at the company, which also highlight relevant 
decisions made internally by the company’s management, this paper sought to emphasize a 
dimension that is not widely remarked upon in the literature: the fundamental relationship 
between the company and the government. As demonstrated, each of the company’s 
development phases was also marked by an approximation with governmental policies, which 
catapulted the company from its local operations into becoming a leading company in the 
sector. Its origin is perfectly articulated with the structure of the division of national markets 
among national, foreign and government capitals, established by import substitution programs 
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since the Kubitschek administration. Its development depended substantially on government 
demands during the military government, central to which was a project to expand the supply 
of energy based on Eletrobras. Even in the 1980s, when the Brazilian economy entered a 
profound crisis scenario, the company was continued to benefit from state programs, in a 
vicious cycle that would allow its continued positioning among the leaders of the national 
electric sector. More recently, the company has depended on BNDES policy to finance its 
production and ensure its remarkable market share in the international trade. In short, if the 
internal decisions of the company are to be considered, understanding their due correctness, the 
dimension of the development of the sector as a whole cannot be dismissed. Such analysis 
allows for a more far-reaching and less heroic comprehension of the WEG's achievements.   
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